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As many of the world's most prestigious organizations fall victim to
industrial espionage, hacks, Denial of Service Attacks, and malware
outbreaks our realization of our joint vulnerability becomes that much
more apparent. All Security / Control Frameworks (COBIT, ISO1779, and
HIPAA) advocate external review of critical security elements and
ongoing Risk Assessments and controls monitoring. In support of this
requirement Pivot point offers a wide range of Vulnerability Assessment
& Penetration Testing Services.
Penetration tests are most direct mechanism to substantiate the
existing control environment, assess your organization's vulnerability
to a malicious user, assess your system audit and monitoring processes,
and to test your Incident Response capability.

An External Penetration Test identifies security weaknesses and
strengths of the client's systems and networks as they appear from an
external perspective, operating outside the client's security
perimeter.
Key focus points during External Penetration Tests include:
Identifying NOS and application
vulnerabilities on high asset value / high risk externally facing
systems eCommerce. Mail, Web, FTP, & DNS Servers
Identifying NOS and application
vulnerabilities on high asset value / high risk externally facing
systems eCommerce. Mail, Web, FTP, & DNS Servers
Identifying protocol and network infrastructure vulnerabilities
(clear text passwords, sniff-able network segments, poorly
configured routers, firewalls, RAS, VPN devices, SNMP
vulnerabilities, etc)
Identifying Application level
vulnerabilities, specifically web applications (ZX site scripting,
SQL Injection, cookie hijacking, hidden text exploits)
Identifying System Security issues
(excessive / non-essential services, patch management issues,
application versioning issues)

The Pivot Point test team will deliver an External penetration Test
and Analysis Report that contains an executive security overview,
details the processes / methodologies used, identifies and prioritizes
vulnerabilities, recommendations for risk mitigation, and full detail /
output of all data acquired during the test. The report will be
delivered in bound hard copy format, via secure email (PGP preferred) or
via SFTP.
To ensure that the business objectives of the Penetration testing is
fully achieved, the Perspective, Impact, Stealth, Intensity, Scope, and
Point of Origin are client defined to ensure that the Penetration
Testing fully meets the business objectives of the engagement.

Typically we assume one or a combination of three perspectives:
Black
Box (aka Zero Knowledge) - our team assumes the role of a
malicious external user, with no previous knowledge of your network
structure or security plan. The black box perspective most closely
simulates a malicious external user exploring your externally
accessible infrastructure
White
Box (aka Full Knowledge) - our team assumes the role of a
malicious external user, with access to some level of detail of your
network structure and security plan. This scenario is not typically
utilized
Gray
Box (aka Limited Knowledge) - our team assumes the role of
malicious external user with some knowledge provided as part of the
test to protect certain systems/reduce the project scope, or
simulate the role of an malicious external user working with a
malicious internal user

For each engagement (often defined to a system / segment level) the
"allowable" impact of the penetration test is defined. Typically one or
more of the following Impact postures are assumed:
LI -
our team concentrates it efforts on gathering information (systems,
OS's, Key Applications, Version & Patch levels, etc.) This
information is correlated against known vulnerabilities, but no exploits
are actually performed. This posture is typically only assumed for a
limited number of "high risk" targets (e.g., a critical extranet
application, VPN infrastructure)
MI -
our team attempts all identified exploits except Denial of Service
attacks. This posture is the most common posture assumed for
Penetration Tests
HI -
our team attempts all identified exploits including Denial of Service
attacks. This posture is generally assumed when an organization has
reason to believe that it may be targeted by a malicious user. It is
also used as a means of testing an organizations Incident Response
capability

Typically one of the following Stealth postures is assumed:
Quiet - our team assumes the
posture of a typical malicious user. We are neither intentionally
furtive nor noisy during our testing. We do not make any efforts to
hide our ongoing activities. This posture is most typically used
during normal investigate Penetration Testing or to assess Incident
Response Capability in organizations whose CMM is low in this area
Stealth - our team assumes a
stealth posture during the testing period. Foot-printing operations
are done with the assumption that all ports are firewall filtered
(e.g., packet fragmentation used), that Network Intrusion Detection
Systems are in place (e.g., packet fragmentation, signature
alterations, scans spread over longer periods of time), and that
monitoring is in place. This posture is most typically used during
Penetration Testing for organizations with well developed Security
Infrastructures and Incident Response Capability
Secret Ops - our team assumes
a covert posture during the testing period. In addition to the
typical stealth operations, additional efforts are made to hide the
testing, for example, scan locations are spoofed and rotated, logs
are altered to remove evidence, and indirect scanning methods (e.g.,
idles can) are leveraged. This posture is most typically used during
Penetration Testing for organizations with well developed Security
Infrastructures with a high risk posture

Internal Penetration Tests are often further scoped by Business
Objective, Data Classification, Audit Objectives, Device Segmentation,
Network Segmentation, Business Unit Segmentation, and other mechanisms.
The number of potential scoping options is unlimited but may include:
System
Specific (e.g., FTP Server)
Application Specific (e.g., eCommerce
Application)
Data
Specific (aka, internal Database which is accessed by a DMZ
application)

Typically one of the following Intensity postures is assumed:
Investigative - our team
assumes the posture of a "typical" hacker. Our Penetration test is
done with the same curiosity as that of a typical hacker. In the
event that intriguing or easy compromises do not appear in the
amount of time that a typical hacker might extend, we assume that
the typical hacker would have moved on to easier opportunities and
move on to other challenges. This posture is typically assumed if
an organization wants to gain a quick assessment of their overall
security posture
Tenacious - our team assumes
the posture of a "determined" hacker (e.g., a disgruntled employee).
Our Penetration test is done with an increased fervor, level of
effort, and tenacity. More aggressive forms of hacking including
dumpster diving, war dialing, war driving, and social engineering
may be employed, dependent upon the clients' objectives. This
posture is typically assumed if an organization wants to gain a
truer assessment of their overall security posture

The Point of Origin is another means of further defining the scope of
a Penetration Testing engagement.
Single - our test team is
limited to a Single Point of Origin for the Penetration test. For
example, in a Capture the Flag engagement, our Point of Origin might
be the Internet, that is fire walled from the data we are trying to
capture. In the vent that our test team can not cross the firewall,
the Penetration Test is terminated
Multiple - our test team is
allowed Multiple Points of Origin during the Penetration test.
Using the same Capture the Flag example from above, after
determining that our test team could not access the target data, our
point of origin would be moved to a semi-trusted LAN segment that
houses the data and our efforts would resume. The advantages of a
Multiple Point of Origin engagement are that it better reflects the
reality of ever changing security postures:
New exploits are identified on a daily
basis, accordingly, the firewall may be easily compromised the
next day, and the security posture of the secondary segment
would not have been validated in a Single Point of Origin
engagement
An actual malicious user may gain access on
a network segment other than the one chosen in a Single Point of
Origin engagement
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